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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900497-CA

CHANNAN S. SINGH,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant ti. iil.il
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2) (ft fP ..

.

i

defendant

1 district

court criminal action may take an appeal to t-he C

• Appeals

nai judgment and conviction for :• _ crime other than a
first degree or capital ielony.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent part,"
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41-2-111(1)
41-2-133(1)
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

For a "writing" to constitute a forgery, must it first

evidence the existence of a legally enforceable right or privilege?
(i.e. Is "legal efficacy" a necessary element of forgery?).

Since

this issue involves a question of law, "we [appellate courts] accord
conclusions of law no particular deference, but review them for
correctness."
2.

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

Did the trial court err when it refused to instruct the

jury on the defendant theories of the case (which included lesser
included offense instructions)?

Where "the requested instruction is

denied, no prejudicial error occurs if it appears that the giving of
the requested instruction would not have affected the outcome of the
trial."

State v. McCumber. 622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for

Forgery, five counts, all second degree felonies, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990), with one count enhanced pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001, -1002 (1990) (habitual criminal), in
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, presiding.
Defendant Channan Singh initially moved to quash the
bindover to the circuit court, alleging that there was insufficient
evidence for trial.

(R 22-26).

Mr. Singh later moved to dismiss

the Information for reasons similar to those stated in his motion to
quash (the evidence revealed at the preliminary hearing would not

- 2 -

satisfy each and every e,«- *

Singh

,K : I - J O ;

renewed his motion before trial, (T 2-18), and again, 1
State's case-in-chief,

(T 81 )

.e

The court rejected these motions

and h i s e x c e p t i o n s t o tl le ji u : }. :i i i s t r u r t in HIS.
STATEMENT O F T H E

(T 84-85) .

FACTS

On N o v e m b e r 2 7 , 1 9 8 9 , W e s t V a l l e y D e t e c t i v e Hoii111;, Wriqhi
went

to 4 0

; B e n v i e w D r i v e t o buy a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e from, an u n n a m e d

individual

•
• i n<j i v HJUI »I w a s n o t t h e r e

a n o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l , C h a n n a n S i n g h , sold D e t e c t i v e Wright
t e m p o r a r y d r i v e r ' s p e r m i t s for $ 1 0 0 .
Exhibit

although
f;wo

(T 5 6 - 5 7 ) ; s e e S t a t e ' s

1; Addendu
Filled

*

each p e r m i t w e r e t h e e x p i r a t i o n U a W ^

the

s i g n a t u r e f o r t h e e x a m i n e r and t h e d i r e c t o r , t h e r e s u l t s of t h e
i lefitnui urn not at i nn

e x a m i n a t i o n , .mu
Exhibit

|T 5 7 - 5 8 ) ; s e e S t a t e ' s

T h e D e t e c t i v e d i d n o t s e e M r . S i n g h not
{V 6 8 ) ,

o u t t h e p a r t i a l l y c o m p l e t e d licenses,.
permit were spaces

for tht name,

df.yont: clur

L e f t b l a n k on each

address, birth date, height,

w e i g h t , s e x , e y e c o l o r , and s i g n a t u r e ol the l i c e n s e e ,
S t a t e ' s Exhibit

; see

1

Detect ::i \ *

f

. a unau t h e p a r t i a l l y

completed

l i c e n s e s , i i i t h e form a s sold to h e r , w e r e
permits.

fill

(T 6 8 ) ; s e e S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t s

.

(specifically s t a t e d o n

t h e tempo? iJI y itr i vei * «•• I II'PIIS** is the n o t a t i o n ,
Licensee's Signature11); see also

iT /'»

r

"Not V a l i d

Without

( who re in Detei t i .,H»« Mri>i.

testified that permits without "information as to the identity of

- 3
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the person" would not be valid); cf. (R 32) ("At the preliminary
hearing Officer Holly Wright and Detective Carroll Mays testified
that the partially completed forms were not useable as temporary
permits").
On December 7, 1989, Detective Wright purchased two more
temporary driver's licenses from Mr. Singh for $100.

(T 59-60).

The spaces filled in and left blank on the second set of licenses
were consistent with the markings and omissions on the first set of
licenses.

Compare State's Exhibit 1 with State's Exhibit 2.

Detective Wright did not see anyone write on the second set of
permits, and admitted that their incomplete condition would not make
them valid.

(T 69-70).

On December 12, 1989, Detective Wright and Detective Mays
bought 15 blank driver's licenses from Mr. Singh for $400.
(T 75-77).

After Detective Mays indicated that he did not know how

to complete them, Mr. Singh filled out the signature lines for the
director and examiner and then marked some results on the
examination section.

(T 76-77).

In addition, Mr. Singh instructed

both detectives on how to fill out the remainder of the form.
(T 72, 77). None of the temporary licenses, however, were fully
completed by Mr. Singh.

See State's Exhibits 1-3.

The State charged Mr. Singh with five counts of forgery.
(R 7-11); (T 20-21).

During the lower court proceedings, Mr. Singh

moved to dismiss the charges, arguing, inter alia, that the invalid
and incomplete licenses would not (or did not) support the forgery

- 4 -

charges.

See (R 22-26) (Motion to Quash and accompanying

memorandum); (R 31-38) (T 2-18) (Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss the
Information); (T 81) (Motion to Dismiss).

Mr. Singh also excepted

to the court's refusal to charge the jury with his theories of the
case or the lesser included offenses.

(T 110-18).

The trial court

denied Mr. Singh's motions and refused his instructions.

(T 18, 85,

110) .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A forged "writing" must evidence the existence of a legally
enforceable right or privilege.

The writing must also appear to

have been issued by the government.

If a driver's license appears

facially invalid (despite the addition of signatures or markings by
the defendant), no forgery took place because the admittedly invalid
and incomplete license would not evidence the privilege to operate a
motor vehicle.

The government would not issue a partially completed

license and allow the licensee to fill in the blank spaces. Viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the licenses
were not, nor did they purport to be a "writing issued by a
government."
The trial court also erred when it rejected the defendant's
proposed jury instructions. The jury should have been able to
consider whether the defendant completed the crime of forgery or
took only a "substantial step."

Forcing the jury to choose between

forgery or acquittal was improper when other reasonable choices
existed.

- 5 -

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SINCE A FORGED "WRITING" MUST BE COMPLETE.
THE EVIDENCE COULD NOT HAVE SUPPORTED THE
FORGERY CONVICTIONS
Prior to trial and, again, following the State's
case-in-chief, Defendant/Appellant Channan S. Singh moved to dismiss
the charges, alleging, inter alia, that since the involved licenses
were facially incomplete they could not be considered forgeries.
(R 31-38); (T 2-18).

Because the licenses were mostly blank they

would not have, nor purport to have "legal efficacy" (i.e. the
writing must be complete enough to evidence a legally enforceable
right or privilege).1

See (R 32-34).

A forged "writing" would

exist only when, and if, a third party filled in the blank spaces.
In response, the State argued that the forgery statute did
not require proof of a completed writing.

(T 11); Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-6-501. Instead, the State alleged, all it had to prove was a
transfer of a writing.

(T 11-12).

Hence, while neither party

disputed that a "writing" had to exist, the parties did disagree on
whether forgery required a completed writing or whether it was
enough for the license to be partially completed.
The trial court sided with the State, reasoning:

"The

statute indicates [that it is a forgery if a person acts] 'with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud', all you've got to do is
know that the document that you are transferring is capable [of] and

See infra note 3.

probably will be used in facilitating a fraud."
added).

(T 14) (emphasis

Despite the court's reference to "the document," the

question left unanswered (though later rejected by the court) was
whether "the document" had to be a completed document.
The State introduced five2 partially completed "Utah State
Department of Public Safety Driver License Temporary Counter
Permit[s]" as evidence of the alleged crimes.

See State's

Exhibits 1-3; (T 58, 61, 78). The Operators' License Act defines
"license" as "the privilege issued under this chapter to operate a
motor vehicle."
§ 41-2-111(1).

Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-102(13); cf. Utah Code Ann.
Similarly, a forged writing includes "symbols of

2
Four licenses were already partially filled in by an
unknown individual prior to their purchase by the detective. See
State's Exhibits 1 and 2. Detective Wright did not see or know who
had marked the licenses. (T 68-70). Moreover, since the State
offered no evidence to show that the signatures and markings on the
first four licenses were not in fact completed by the authorized
individuals at a proper time or place, Mr. Singh's conduct in simply
selling (but not writing on) the four licenses would not constitute
the crime of forgery. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501. But cf. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (Theft by Receiving Stolen Property).
Insufficient evidence therefore existed for the first four counts of
forgery as the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the first four licenses were fraudulent. (i.e. If, as the jury must
have necessarily found, the government would issue partially
completed licenses, (R 101-11, 120-24), Mr. Singh may have only
stolen such government writings and then attempted to sell them.
Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408; see infra Point II.C). When State's
Exhibit 3 (the license Mr. Singh partially filled in) is compared
with State's Exhibits 1 and 2, the stylistic differences reveal that
Mr. Singh did not mark the first four licenses. Compare State's
Exhibit 1 and 2 with State's Exhibit 3 (unlike the four licenses
already filled in, Mr. Singh's license listed the director and
examiner as the same person; Mr. Singh did not complete the
restriction space or the expiration date; and Mr. Singh's penmanship
is different).
- 7 -

value, right, privilege, or identification."
§ 76-6-501(2); (R 111).

Utah Code Ann.

Because the State classified the forgeries

as second degree felonies, it was also required to prove that the
writing was (or purportedly had been) "issued by a government, or
any agency thereof[.]"

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (3); (T 14);

(R 102, 104, 106, 108, 110). As discussed below, the necessary
implications of the these statutory provisions required the
"writing" to be (or appear) complete.3
If, as in the case at bar, a "writing" contained blank
spaces, it would have no legal effect and could not be considered a
governmentally issued instrument.
57 (Iowa 1988); (T 4-5, 8, 13-14).

Cf. State v. Ortega, 418 N.W.2d
In Ortega, the State argued that

creating blank driver's license forms should be criminal because of
"the existence of an illegal market for forms of false
identification[.]"

418 N.W.2d at 59. The Ortega Court disagreed,

finding that since the blank forms were not public documents and
void on their face, they could not be considered forgeries. A
person would first have to complete the license before it appeared

3

Mr. Singh does not contend that in order to be
"complete," every "i" must be dotted or every "t" must be crossed.
Rather, the writing must at least appear complete enough to be a
symbol "of value, right, privilege, or identification." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-501(2); cf. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-102(13); Utah Code
Ann. § 41-2-404(1); State v. Ortega, 418 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Iowa 1988)
("blank computer printed forms [driver's licenses], having no legal
efficacy, are void on their face [as they] evidence no legally
enforceable right and therefore have no capacity to deceive anyone
concerning rights or liabilities affected by government").
- 8 -

to "evidence the completed acts of any public servants . . . ."
Id.

Prior to their completion, no forgery exists.
Utah/s Code may not explicitly list the common law element

of "legal efficacy" in its forgery statute, see Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-501, but the forgery charges nonetheless require the
"writing" to symbolize a right or privilege issued by the
government.

Id.

No privilege attaches to an invalid license.

Conspicuously displayed on each license is the following notation:
"Not Valid Without Licensee's Signature."
Exhibits 1-3.

See State's

The plain language of the permit unequivocally

demands that the licensee sign the permit.

As long as the

licensee's signature line remains blank, the license cannot be
considered a valid writing issued by the government.

Hence, even if

an authorized examiner and director signed their names and filled in
all the necessary information, a license lacking the licensee's
signature would still appear invalid.

See State's Exhibits 1-3.

The licenses here contained far more blank spaces than a
licensee's signature line. All the spaces identifying the licensee
were left blank.

Facially void, the arresting officers even

admitted that the confiscated forms were not useable in their
present form as temporary driver's permits.

(R 32); (T 68, 79) .

The numerous blank spaces made it apparent that the licenses had not
been issued by the government.

Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-404(1).

Absent completion of the pertinent identifying information, the
partially completed licenses did not appear to be symbols "of value,

- 9 -

right, privilege, or identification."
§ 76-6-501(2).

Utah Code Ann.

No "writing" therefore existed.

Moreover, as a practical matter, no one4 would accept such
a license as evidence of a privilege.

For example, if an officer

stopped an unlicensed driver who produced one of Mr. Singh,s
licenses, the officer would not consider the license to have been
issued by the government.

The Division of Motor Vehicles would not

issue a predominately blank license, nor allow the licensee to
independently fill in the necessary information.
§ 41-2-404(1).

£f. Utah Code Ann.

No "writing," and consequently, no forgery exists

when the driver's license remains substantially incomplete.

Only

when, and if, the unlicensed driver fills in the blanks will the
writing appear legally and governmentally issued.
insufficient to support the forgery convictions.

The evidence was
See State's

Exhibits 1-3; (T 58, 61, 78).
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO CHARGE THE
JURY WITH THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES.
Assuming, arguendo, the trial court properly concluded that
a "writing" issued by the government (the temporary driver's
licenses) may be totally devoid of information identifying the

4

Indeed, if a minor attempted to buy alcohol with a
license containing no indicia of identification (e.g. no age, name,
or height), the minor would leave empty-handed. The minor's
"license" would not satisfy the cashier because of its incomplete
nature. Absent the inclusion of the required identification by the
minor, the license would not be (nor purport to be) governmentally
issued. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-404.
- 10 -

applicant, the court nonetheless erred when it refused to instruct
the jury with the defendants requested instructions on Attempted
Forgery, Prohibited Use of a License, and Theft by Receiving Stolen
Property.

(T 110-18); (R 60-81).

"If there [is] any evidence,

however slight, on any reasonable theory of the case under which
defendant might be convicted of a lesser included offense, the trial
court must, if requested, give an appropriate instruction."

State

v. Chesnut. 621 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980) (emphasis in original); State
v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 157 (Utah 1983) ("where proof of an element
of the crime is in dispute, the availability of the "third
option"—the choice of conviction of a lesser offense rather than
conviction of the greater or acquittal—gives the defendant the
benefit of the reasonable doubt standard").
The instruction for a lesser included offense "must be
given if (i) the statutory elements of greater and lesser included
offenses overlap to some degree, and (ii) the evidence provides a
'rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.'"

State

v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) (construing State v. Baker,
671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983)); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4)
(1990).

The two pronged Baker analysis "should be liberally

construed."

Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424, especially where, as here, the

defendant requested the lesser included offense instruction.5

5

The prosecution must show more compelling circumstances
than the defendant when it requests the lesser included offense
-[footnote continued on next page]-

- 11 -

If a defendant requests a lesser included instruction,
as was the case here, an evidence-based standard
controls. . . • If the same facts tend to prove
elements of more than one statutory offense and the
evidence is ambiguous and susceptible to alternative
explanations, the trial court must give the lesser
included offense instruction if any one of the
alternative interpretations provides both a rational
basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the
offense charged and convicting him of the included
offense. . . . [I]n determining whether a rational
jury could acquit on the greater charge and find guilt
on the lesser charge, the court must view the evidence
and the inferences that can be drawn from it in the
light most favorable to the defendant.
State v. Velarde. 734 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added and
footnotes omitted).
A.

THE COURT SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED THE JURY WITH AN
"ATTEMPTED FORGERY" INSTRUCTION.

The statutory elements of forgery and attempted forgery
necessarily overlap with one another.

See Utah Code Ann.

§§ 76-4-101, 76-6-501; cf. State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah
1986) ("the test is whether the elements overlap at all"); State v.
Brown, 694 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah 1984) (emphasis in original) ("there
must be some overlap in the definitions of the two crimes, even
though they need not meet the totally 'included' standard").

Thus,

the first prong of Baker was satisfied.

5 -[cont'd]instruction. State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421,
424 n.5 (Utah 1986). Unlike the minimal standard placed on the
defendant, see id. at 424 ("the test is whether the elements overlap
at all"), "when the prosecution seeks instruction on a proposed
lesser included offense, both the legal elements and the actual
evidence or inferences needed to demonstrate those elements must
necessarily be included within the original charge offense. State
v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1983) (emphasis in original).
- 12 -

The evidence presented at trial also satisfied the second
prong.

"Clearly, under Utah law, the crime of attempted forgery

involves the same culpability and dishonesty as does the crime of
forgery itself."

State v. Ross. 782 P.2d 529, 531 (Utah App.

1989) . Since Mr. Singh left most of the license blank, the jury may
have believed that he did not fully satisfy the act of forgery.
Even if "legal efficacy" is not a required element of the
forgery statute, the jury still may have considered the blank spaces
significant enough to acquit Mr. Singh of forgery had the lesser
included offense of attempted forgery been available.

Mr. Singh's

conduct may have been viewed as a "substantial step" towards the
making, completing, or transferring of a writing which purported to
be the act of another.

Hence, there was "a rational basis for . . .

acquitting the defendant of [forgery] and convicting him of
[attempted forgery]."

Baker, 671 P.2d at 159; cf. State v. Brown,

694 P.2d 587, 590 (Utah 1984) (if the jury could have accepted the
defendant's testimony concerning a lesser included offense, "however
unlikely that might have been," it was error to refuse the
instruction).

Both prongs were satisfied.

Without the attempted forgery instruction, the jury was
left with two choices: guilty of forgery or complete acquittal.
(R 117-18).

Apparently believing that Mr. Singh had done something

wrong, the jury opted for a conviction.

Cf. Keeble v. United

States, 412 U.S. 205, 213 (1973) (emphasis in original) ("Where one
of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the
defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to
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resolve its doubts in favor of conviction"); State v. Hansen,
734P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986) ("This is exactly the sort of forced
choice that lesser included offense instructions are designed to
avoid, and exactly the choice that the jury would not have had to
make if [the lesser included offense] instruction had been given").
The trial court erred in refusing to give the attempted forgery
instruction.

(R 72-81).

The trial court attempted to justify its refusal, reasoning
that forgery does not require a "transfer" and Mr. Singh did more
than merely "attempt" the act of forgery.

See (T 85).

As explained

above, even if the trial court was correct, the perceived completion
of the crime provided no basis for refusing the defendant's
"attempt" instruction.

Cf. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah

1983) ("The court must only decide whether there is a sufficient
quantum of evidence presented to justify sending the cfuestion to the
jury, . . . if there is a sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a
jury question regarding a lesser offense, then the court should
instruct the jury regarding the lesser offense").
Moreover, despite noting the abrogation of common law, see
(T 85), the trial court's rejection of the attempted forgery
instruction was ironically supported by a now outdated common law
rule.

In State v. Burks. 29 Utah 2d 378, 510 P.2d 532 (1973), the

Court acknowledged that common law prohibited a defendant from being
"convicted of the crime of attempt, if in fact the crime had been
completed[.]"

510 P.2d at 533.

Similarly, if the trial court here

was indeed correct in believing that Mr. Singh had actually
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consummated the crime of forgery, common law then would have
precluded the court from charging him with attempted forgery.
However, since the common law prohibition is no longer in
force,6 the court's decision was flawed.

An individual may also be

charged with "attempted forgery" notwithstanding the perceived or
actual completion of the crime.

The court must let the jury decide

whether the defendant completed the crime or simply made an attempt.
B.

THE COURT SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED THE JURY WITH A
"PROHIBITED USE OF A LICENSE" INSTRUCTION.

The trial court also erred when it rejected the defendant's
Prohibited Use of a License instruction.
§ 41-2-133.

(R 62-71); Utah Code Ann.

"Prohibited Use of a License" forbids a person from

causing or permitting the display of a fictitious license. Utah
Code Ann. § 41-2-133(1); see also Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-133(2) (it
is unlawful for a person to "lend or knowingly permit the use of a
license issued to him, by a person not entitled to it").

"Forgery"

similarly requires, inter alia, that a person act with the purpose
to defraud or facilitate a fraud.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1).

The trial court and the State both acknowledged the overlapping
nature of the charges:

6

The Burks Court cited Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-30 (1953)
as authority for rejecting the common law prohibition. See State v.
Burks, 29 Utah 2d 378, 510 P.2d 532, 533 (1973). This statutory
provision has since been repealed. Nevertheless, the existing
statute which repealed and replaced the old provision also abrogates
the common law. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (1973 & Supp. 1990).
Thus, the principles of Burks still hold true for the instant action.
- 15 -

[The State]: We couldn't charge under that statute
[Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-133], Judge.
The Court: You could have under (1). You could have
charged under 41-2-133. It's a misdemeanor for a
person to display or cause or permit to be displayed
or to have in possession any license knowing it is
fictitious, [you] could have charged under that if you
had wished to.
What you're saying is, you charged under the
fraud statute because you had the transfer.
[The State]: And the additional element raised it to
this charge [forgery].
(T 18) .
The State's concerns were irrelevant.

Even if the greater

offense includes additional elements, the lesser offense may still
be included.

See State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986)

(requiring only "overlap to some degree"); State v. Baker, 671 P.2d
152, 159 (Utah 1983) ("where two offenses are related because some
of their statutory elements overlap, and where the evidence at the
trial of the greater offense includes proof of some or all of those
overlapping elements, the lesser offense is an included offense
under [Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402](3)(a)"). Moreover, the court
cannot, on the one hand, hold that Forgery does not require a
transfer, (T 85), and then, on the other, reject the Prohibited Use
of a License instruction because it did not contain the element of a
"transfer."

The first prong of Baker was satisfied.

As alluded to by the court, the second prong was also
satisfied.

Detectives Wright and Mays watched Mr. Singh, an

individual not authorized to act on behalf of the State, partially
complete a temporary driver's license.
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(T 76-77).

Previously, on

November 27, 1989, and December 7, 1989, Mr. Singh possessed and
sold Detective Wright a pair of similarly marked licenses.
(T 57-60).

If these partially completed licenses were in fact valid

and if, as discussed before the jury could have viewed Mr. Singh's
conduct as falling short of the completed crime of forgery, the
evidence provided a rational basis for acquitting him of the greater
offense and convicting him of the included offense.

Hansen, 734

P.2d at 424. The trial court erred in refusing Mr. Singh's proposed
instructions.
C

(R 62-71).
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED THE JURY WITH A
"THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY" INSTRUCTION.

Another instruction discounted by the trial court was Theft
by Receiving Stolen Property.
-412(1)(c).

(R 60-61); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408;

"A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or

disposes of the property of another . . . or aids in concealing,
selling, or withholding any such property from the owner, knowing
the property to be stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner
thereof."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1).

Forgery requires that a

person act with the purpose to defraud or facilitate a fraud.
Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1).

Utah

The overlapping element of fraudulent

conduct thus satisfied the first prong.
Since the jury convicted Mr. Singh of a second degree
felony, it must have necessarily believed that the writing was or
purportedly had been "issued by a government, or any agency
thereof[.]"

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(3)(a); (R 102, 104, 106, 108,

110); see State's Exhibits 1-3.

When Mr. Singh sold the licenses,
- 17 -

the jury may have rationally believed that he "dispose[d] of the
property of another knowing that it ha[d] been stolen . . . ." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1).

As stated above, the jury may have also

acquitted him of forgery.

Because the second prong was therefore

satisfied, the trial court should not have refused Mr. Singh's
requested instructions.

(R 60-61).
POINT III

THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO INFORM THE
JURY OF HIS THEORY OF THE CASE.
Assuming further that, for some reason, the defendant/s
requested instructions did not qualify as lesser included offenses,
they still supported his theories and should have been considered by
the jury.
The well-recognized general rule entitles a party to
have his theory of the case submitted to the jury.
Where there is evidence adduced to support a party's
theory of the case, it is prejudicial error for the
trial court to fail to instruct thereon.
Nevertheless, the court cannot be said to have failed
to properly instruct the jury when requested
instructions are fully covered in other instructions
given.
Watters v. Ouerry. 626 P.2d 455, 458-59 (Utah 1981); State v. Alv,
782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989) ("A criminal defendant is
entitled to have the gist of his defense reflected in the
instructions given to the jury, and the instructions should not
incorrectly or misleadingly state the material rules of law"); State
v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980) ("We are not concerned with
the reasonableness, nor the credibility of the defendant's evidence
relating to his claim of self defense [the theory of the case as
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long as] . . . there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to
justify it").
As noted above, the evidence reasonably supported the
inclusion of the instructions on Attempted Forgery, Prohibited Use
of a License,7 and Theft by Receiving Property.

The defendant's

requested instructions were not covered by the court's other
instructions.

The trial court erred when it rejected the

defendant's theories.

7

Mr. Singh also noted that "Prohibited Use of a License"
was more specifically tailored for the involved conduct than the
generally worded Forgery statute. (T 14-16, 115); compare Utah Code
Ann. § 41-2-133 with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501. As stated in
Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979), if a Controlled
Substances Act provision "is specifically designed to prohibit the
presentation of false or forged prescriptions" it governs over the
more generally restrictive forgery statute. Id. at 335.
Mr. Singh's proposed "Operators' License Act" provision should have
similarly governed over the generally worded forgery statute. See
id. ("where two statutes interdict the same conduct, but impose
different penalties, the violator is entitled to the lesser
punishment"); State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146, 148
(1969) ("where there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two
punishments is applicable to an offense an accused is entitled to
the benefit of the lesser"). The trial court erred in using the
statute which allowed the greater punishment.
- 19 -

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction because there was insufficient evidence to support the
forgery charges or reverse the case and remand for a new trial with
the addition of his proposed jury instructions.
SUBMITTED this

/j

day of January9/f 1991.

RONALD S. FUJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

41-2-102

MOTOR VEHICLES

41-2-102. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
„
(1) "Cancellation" means the termination by action of the division of
license issued through error or fraud or for which necessary consent
been withdrawn.
(2) "Class D license" means the class of license issued for vehicles n
defined as commercial vehicles or motorcycles under this title.
i
(3) "Class M license" means the class of license issued for a motorcycl<
as defined under this chapter.
i
(4) "Commercial driver license (CDL)" means a license issued substan
tially in accordance with the requirements of Title XII, Pub. L. 99-571
the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, and in accordance witi
Part 7, Chapter 2, Title 41, which authorizes the holder to drive a class di
commercial motor vehicle.
]
(5) (a) "Commercial motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle designed o:
used to transport passengers or property if the vehicle:
(i) has a gross vehicle weight rating of 26,001 or more pomn
or a lesser rating as determined by federal regulation;
•«
(ii) is designed to transport more than 15 passengers, includ
ing the driver; or
^
(iii) is transporting hazardous materials and is required to be
placarded in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 172, Subpart P.
Ob) The following vehicles are not considered a commercial motoi
vehicle for purposes of Part 7, Chapter 2, Title 41, the Uniform Commercial Driver License Act:
\
(i) equipment owned and operated by the United States De-*
partment of Defense when operated by any active duty military^
personnel and members of the reserves and national guard on*
active duty including personnel on full-time national guard duty,!
personnel on part-time training, and national guard military
technicians and civilians who are required to wear military uni-i
forms and are subject to the code of military justice;
^
(ii) vehicles controlled and operated by a farmer to transport
agricultural products, farm machinery, or farm supplies to or
from a farm within 150 miles of his farm but not in operation as
contract or common motor carrier;
(iii) firefighting and emergency vehicles; and
(iv) recreational vehicles that are not used in commerce and
are operated solely as family or personal conveyances for recreational purposes.
j
(6) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of the Department of Pub-1]
lie Safety.
(7) "Denial" or "denied" means the withdrawal of a driving privilege by
the division to which the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 12a, Title 41, '
Proof of Owner's or Operator's Security, do not apply.
(8) "Disqualification" means either:
I
(a) the suspension, revocation, cancellation, denial, or any other J
withdrawal by a state of a person's privileges to drive a commercial
motor vehicle;
104
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(b) a determination by the Federal Highway Administration, under 49 C.F.R. Part 386, that a person is no longer qualified to operate
a commercial motor vehicle under 49 C.F.R. Part 391; or
(c) the loss of qualification which automatically follows conviction
of an offense listed in 49 C.F.R. Part 383.51.
(9) "Division" means the Driver License Division of the Department of
Public Safety.
(10) "Drive" means:
(a) to operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle upon a
highway; and
(b) in Subsections 41-2-715(1) through (3), Subsection 41-2-715(5),
and Sections 41-2-716 and 41-2-717, the operation or physical control
of a motor vehicle at any place within the state.
(11) "Farm tractor" means every motor vehicle designed and used primarily as a farm implement for drawing plows, mowing machines, and
other implements of husbandry.
(12) "Highway" means the entire width between property lines of every
way or place of any nature when any part of it is open to the use of the
public, as a matter of right, for vehicular traffic.
(13) "License" means the privilege issued under this chapter to operate
a motor vehicle.
(14) "License certificate" means the evidence of the privilege issued
under this chapter to operate a motor vehicle.
(15) "Motor vehicle" means every self-propelled vehicle and every vehicle propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but
not operated upon rails, except motorized wheel chairs and vehicles
moved solely by human power.
(16) "Motorcycle" means every motor vehicle, other than a tractor, having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel with not
more than three wheels in contact with the ground.
(17) "Nonresident" means a person who is not a resident of this state
and who has not sojourned or engaged in any gainful occupation in this
state for an aggregate period of 60 days in the preceding 12 months and
also every person who is temporarily assigned by his employer to work in
Utah.
(18) "Operate" means to be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.
(19) "Operator" means any person who is in actual physical control of a
vehicle.
(20) "Owner" means a person other than a lienholder having an interest in the property or title to a vehicle. The term includes a person entitled to the use and possession of a vehicle subject to a security interest in
another person but excludes a lessee under a lease not intended as security.
(21) "Person" means every natural person, firm, partnership, association, or corporation.
(22) "Reportable violation" means an offense required to be reported to
the Driver License Division as determined by the division and includes
those offenses against which points are assessed under Section 41-2-128.
(23) "Revocation" means the termination by action of the division of a
licensee's privilege to operate a motor vehicle.
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41-2-111. Temporary learner permit — Instruction permit
— Commercial driver instruction permit.
(1) (a) The division upon receiving an application for a class D or M license
from a person 16 years of age or older may in its discretion issue a temporary learner permit after the person has successfully passed all parts of
the examination not involving the actual operation of a motor vehicle.
(b) The temporary learner permit allows the applicant, while having
the permit in his immediate possession, to operate a motor vehicle upon
the highways for six months from the date of the application in conformance with the restrictions indicated on the permit as determined by
rules of the division,
(2) The division upon receiving an application may in its discretion issue an
instruction permit effective for one year to an applicant who is enrolled in a
driver education program that includes practice driving if the program is
approved by the State Office of Education even though the applicant has not
reached the legal age to be eligible for a license. The instruction permit entitles the permittee when he has the permit in his immediate possession to
operate a motor vehicle, only when an approved instructor is occupying a seat
beside the permittee.

41-2-133, Prohibited uses of license — Penalty.
It is a class B misdemeanor for a person to:
(1) display or cause or permit to be displayed or to have in possession
any license knowing it is fictitious or has been canceled, denied, revoked,
suspended, disqualified, or altered;
(2) lend or knowingly permit the use of a license issued to him, by a
person not entitled to it;
(3) display or to represent as his own a license not issued to him;
(4) fail or refuse to surrender to the division upon demand any license
which has been denied, suspended, disqualified, canceled, or revoked;
(5) use a false name or give a false address in any application for a
license or any renewal or duplicate of the license, or to knowingly make a
false statement, or to knowingly conceal a material fact or otherwise
commit a fraud in the application; or
(6) permit any other prohibited use of a license issued to him.

41-2-404. Identification card — Contents — Specifications.
(1) The commissioner shall issue a card of identification which provides all
the information contained in the application, other than place of birth, and a
photograph of the applicant and facsimile of the applicant's signature.
(2) The card shall be of an impervious material, resistant to wear, damage,
and alteration. The size, form, and color of the card is prescribed by the
commissioner.
(3) At the applicant's request, the card may include a statement that the
applicant has a special medical problem or allergies to certain drugs, for the
purpose of medical treatment.
(4) The card may also indicate the applicant's intent to make an anatomical
gift, under the same procedure as provided for an operator license under
Subsection 41-2-121(3).

76-1-30
"This section specifically provides that a person may be
convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it
appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted
was perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt,"
State v. Burks, 29 Utah 2d 378- 510 P.2d 532, 533 (1973).

76-1-105. Common law crimes abolished*
Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a crime unless made so
by this code, other applicable statute or ordinance.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-105, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-105; 1974, ch. 32, § 1.

76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode —• Included offenses*
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the ofifense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.

76-4-101. Attempt — Elements of offense.
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step
toward commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise:
(a) Because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) Due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed
them to be.

76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbrokers.
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding any such property from the owner, knowing the property to be
stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof.

76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for
treble damages against receiver of stolen property.
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000;
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft;
or
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another;
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more
than $1,000;
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer,
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry;
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
$100 or less.

76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) Alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent
or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in
a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method
of recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to
be:
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a government, or any agency thereof; or
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks,
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or
claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any
person or enterprise.
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UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
Driver License Temporary Counter Permit

RESULTS OF EXAMINATION
NO

RESULT

^ ^

CURRENT UTAH DRIVER LICENSE NO.
ADULT 21 MINOR D
^7
CLASS D MOTORCYCLE D

EXAI
EXAMINER

DATE

t ZMS^M

TEMPORARY DRIVING PERMIT
When COMPLETED and SIGNED by A DRIVER
LICENSE EXAMINER THIS IS YOUR TEMPORARY
PERMIT TO DRIVE UNTIL YOU RECEIVE
YOUR PERMANENT ORIVER LICENSE
„

NAME
AOORESS

EXPIRATION D/yffc /fiX* 7 ~ ' / / ^
INSTRUCTION (LEARNER) PERMIT
D

THIS PERMIT ALLOWS YOU TO DRIVE A
MOTOR VEHICLE (EXCEPT MOTOR
CYCLES) WHEN ACCOMPANIED BY A
LICENSED DRIVER ONLY

D

ORJVE A MOTORCYCLE WITHOUT PAS •
SENGERS. DAYLIGHT HOURS ONLY.
AND NOT TO DR»/E ON MAJOR ROADS

EXPIRATION DATE
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UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
Driver License Temporary Counter Permit

RESULTS OF EXAMINATION
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EEZT

CURRENT UTAH DRIVER LICENSE NO.
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fl
CLASS • MOTORCYCLE D
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EXAMINER

DATE

V'wm

TEMPORARY DRIVING PERMIT
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LICENSE EXAMINER THIS IS YOUR TEMPORARY
PERMIT TO DRIVE UNTIL YOU RECEIVE
YOUR PERMANENT DRIVER LICENSE*

BIRTH OATE
DATE
HEIGHT
FT

INSTRUCTION (LEARNER) PERMIT

19,
SEX

WEIGHT

IN

RESTRICT.^

EYES

•

THIS PERMIT ALLOWS YOU TO DRIVE A
MOTOR VEHICLE (EXCEPT MOTORCYCLES) WHEN ACCOMPANIED BY A
LICENSED ORIVER ONLY

•

DRIVE A MOTORCYCLE WITHOUT PASSENGERS. DAYLIGHT HOURS ONLY.
AND NOT T015&I VE ON MAJOR ROADS

LBS.

j
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p

'f
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UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
Driver License Temporary Counter Permit

RESULTS OF EXAMINATION
NO

CURRENT UTAH DRIVER LICENSE NO
ADULT •

MINOR U

CLASS D

RESULT

-m

EXAMINER

DATE

I

7T& S

C

TEMPORARY DRIVING PERMIT

MOTORCYCLE D

When COMPLETED and SIGNED by A DRIVER
LICENSE EXAMINER THIS IS YOUR TEMPORARY
PERMIT TO DRIVE UNTIL YOU RECEIVE
YOUR PERMANENT DRIVER LICENSE

NAME
ADDRESS

EXPIRATION OA/f$

A/s2\^*kj\

BIRTH DATE

HEIGHT

SEX

IN |
FT
RESTRICTION^

Signature,
X

INSTRUCTION (LEARNER) PERMIT

19.

DATE

53

WEIGHT

EYES

D

G~ST*L^

THIS PERMIT ALLOWS YOU TO DRIVE A
MOTOR VEHICLE (EXCEPT MOTOR
CYCLES) WHEN ACCOMPANIED BY A
LICENSED DRIVER ONLY

D

DRIVE A MOTORCYCLE WITHOUT PAS
SENGERS DAYLIGHT HOURS ONLY
AND NOT TQ-O^RIVE ON MAJOR ROAJDS

LBS

ERASURES ALTERATIONS AND/OR Ol ^ITERATIONS WILL VOID
THIS PERMITVND MAY RflgJJLT IN TH SUSPENSION OF YOUR
DRIVING PRIVILEGE

EXAMINER

I Q
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UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
* Driver License Temporary Counter Permit
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Driver License Temporary Counter Permit
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CURRENT UTAH DRIVER LICENSE NO
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EXPIRATION D,
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IN
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DATE

When COMPLETED and SIGNED by A DRIVER
LICENSE EXAMINER THIS IS YOUR TEMPORARY
PERMIT TO DRIVE UNTIL YOU RECEIVE
YOUR PERMANENT DRIVER LICENSE

NAME

HEIGHT
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•XAMII

-
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WEIGHT
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